Re: virus: belieph/rationality ratio

Tue, 23 Mar 1999 10:17:51 -0800

carlw wrote:

> I would like to suggest these modifications to the definition. Phaith; n
> 1. the internalizing and embodying of a principle, frequenlty resulting from
> an experience of boundary dissolution and/or seeming participation in a
> wider, more pervasive consciousness than is the accepted norm and
> integrating the principle and/or the effects of the experience into one's
> actions, perceptions, and decission making. Also Phaith[0] <- That is a
> zero. Having thought about it, that usage may be preferable to a '?' as a
> '?' implies unknown while '0' implies not defined or possibly Phaith[z].
> 2. that level of trust in one's modus which is necessary to function in an
> uncertain world. Also Phaith[r], Fides.

I think your additions are helpful except that I thing the "trust in one's modus" is an apt alternate definition of all three varieties of phaith; not just of the rationalist's phaith.

> 3. trust in a 'religious' sense (This isn't prescriptive, just a suggestion
> until a religious person or people define it better) in some being or power.
> Also Phaith[i], Faith.
> And a suggestion for consideration and discussion, Belieph; n
> 1. acceptance of something as a result of phaith whether explicit or
> implicit. Also Belief[0].
> 2. ????, Belieph[r] as a consequence of Phaith[r]
> 3. Belieph[i] as a consequence of Phaith[i], Belief.

What's the most salient distinction between belief and belieph?

> > As for phaith[i] and phaith[r], would you judge some variety of phaith
> > rational/irrational based on its developmental influences or on the
> > results that it has in the life of one who "holds" it? If the
> > latter, I
> > would suggest that adaptive/maladaptive would be a more useful and
> > appropriate designation that rational/irrational.
> I was thinking more along the lines of "motivation".

As you point out a few sentences later, it's difficult, and in some instances impossible, to know what factors shaped a belief, even in one's self, much less in anyone else, so I'm not sure when one might have use for the label's phaith[r] and phaith[i].

> While human beings are
> very good at rationalizing things, I would say that for the purposes of this
> discussion, the reason for holding a certain belief is more important than
> the belief itself. After all there can be many reasons for getting to a
> cetain position. Except for a few unusual circumstances (e.g. certain
> classes of chess problems), a position says very little about the path taken
> to achieve it.

I may have more to say on this. If I do, my thoughts on the matter are coming to a very slow boil. We'll see.