> > In order to accomplish this goal, I would suggest
> > leaving the belieph/rationality ratio of phaith undefined
> (phaith[?] maybe),
>
> Could you say a bit more about what you mean by "belieph/rationality
> ratio?"
I was taking what we had done to faith (phaith) and projecting it to belief. Belief, as much as faith, is made up of shades from the rationalistic "'it' worked that way every previous time I have experienced 'it' and I have no grounds to imagine that 'it' has changed" all the way to "My mommy is dead and living with 'Jesus in heaven' where she looks out for my interests" and way, way weirder.
As 'beliefs' or 'rationalization' are precursor and consequent to faith, I was suggesting that the ratio of 'belieph[i]' to complete rationalization ('belieph[r]') would vary as one moves from phaith[i] to phaith[r] and vice versa, but that attempting to define the exact point where we move from [i] to [r] for 'faith' or 'belief' would be an exercise in futility and probably highly divisive.
I would like to suggest these modifications to the definition. Phaith; n
And a suggestion for consideration and discussion, Belieph; n
uncertain world. Also Phaith[r], Fides.
> As for phaith[i] and phaith[r], would you judge some variety of phaith
> rational/irrational based on its developmental influences or on the
> results that it has in the life of one who "holds" it? If the
> latter, I
> would suggest that adaptive/maladaptive would be a more useful and
> appropriate designation that rational/irrational.
I was thinking more along the lines of "motivation". While human beings are very good at rationalizing things, I would say that for the purposes of this discussion, the reason for holding a certain belief is more important than the belief itself. After all there can be many reasons for getting to a cetain position. Except for a few unusual circumstances (e.g. certain classes of chess problems), a position says very little about the path taken to achieve it. In my opinion, the use of "i" as a significator is also nice as i represents -1^0.5. While granting that rational/irrational may offend some people, the words are there, mean exactly what what they sound like i.e. talk to the kind of phaith involved, and should not be perceived as carrying judgemental overtones. Adaptive/maladaptive would be completely inappropriate as it sounds as if it implies that it applies to the "goodness" of the phaith in achieving certain results which is, as far as I know, not the intention at all.
>
> And I fear to articulate this next thought as it threatens to disrupt
> the incipient coalition, but it seems question begging to me
> to claim or
> to take it as read that phaith[r] would automatically be more adaptive
> than phaith[i].
>
/me pulls on his jackboots and stirs it up :-)
</flame bait mode on>
Well of course it is. Phaith[r] is rational and rational implies that it is
responsive to the environment. Phaith[i] is driven from some internal
belieph[i] source, or from dogma, and neither can possibly react as
effectively to environmental changes as Phaith[r].
</flame bait mode off>
Having said that; and this was one of the reasons that I suggested that the ratio of the roles of belieph and reason be left undefined; I suspect that phaith[r] can sometimes be just as dogmatic as phaith[i] and that sometimes phaith[i] can lead to faster results (e.g. following one's gut reactions where one is well versed in the decision field) and chices of similar quality to phaith[r]. It may not be as certain, but in many choice environments, making a decision and implementing it is more important than the decision itself.
TheHermit
Computers are useless. They can only give you answers. Pablo Picasso
P.S. I like 'chicks' too. But they are much better IRL and in the flesh than on CoV! :-)