>
>On the other hand, Absolute Truth is so much more concrete than the
>lesser varieties, that it is plausibly ludicrous to claim that
>Absolute
>Truth is describable as a proposition. I.e., Absolute Truth does not
>obviously have a truth value, since it is constructed as a noun rather
>
>than as a sentence--declarative, question, or exclamation.
>
>In this sense, Absolute Truth could be a proper part of Objective
>Reality
>[perhaps what Objective Reality takes foundation in.]
Your claim about absolute truth in the conext of this post "is
constructed as a noun rather than as a sentence--declarative, question,
or exclamation." That noun, however, refers to a sentence, and that
sentence has a truth value. It makes perfect sence to say that your
claim has a truth value. Your claim is false.
Absolute truth, if it existed would be a set of propostions, and you can
convert any set of propositions to a single compound propostion without
altering its meaning. Absolute truth, what Kuhn describes as "some one
full, objective, true account of nature" would, if it existed, be a very
long set of propostions which which we could combine into on monsterously
long compound propostion. If it existed, Absolute Truth would have a
truth value. It would be true.
Take care. -KMO