Re: virus: maxims and ground rules and suppositions

Eric Boyd (
Sat, 15 May 1999 12:34:20 -0400


TheHermit <> writes:
> "All statements of truth are embedded in a frame of reference." > (period)

I would support this formulation.

Well then the debate is over -- that line sums up the position we have all been advocating.

"The truth values of all statements are embedded in and dependant upon a
frame of reference."

What advantage does this (more clumsy) version have over the one above? (i.e. what value does adding "dependant on" have over just "embedded in"

<< (re "existants" versus truths)
I still don't think I am making a "mistake". Do you still think that I am?

I think so. It would take me hours to wade through your last post to find out for sure, however. I'll just mention a few things:

It seems to me that a "statement of truth" can be rephrased as: "Thing Assigned Attribute"

Seems a very narrow definition of truth. What about (political) statements such as "people should engage only in autonomy respecting relationships"? Wait. I guess according to your definition of "things" as including "imaginary" objects, it *might* still work.


> The universe doesn't have truths.  The universe exists -- truths
> only come into play when we attempt to describe or communicate
> the nature of the universe.  The *nature* of Pi (the "existant")
> remains the same -- but the encoding of Pi (the [statement of]
> changes depending on how and who encodes it. [the "frame of > reference" is variable]

Just depends on the definition of truth, addressed above and the definition
of PI addressed in my earlier post today. Do we still disagree?

(the square backet additions are mine) I don't know if we still agree. It is my understanding that the maxim in question *defines* truth such that my paragraph above is true by definition. If your definition of truth makes it not so, then you are not agreeing with the maxim -- and we are back to square one.

Finally, regarding your definition of the universe (and subsequently of Pi), I disagree. It is axiomatic to me that the universe contains only real things. The universe does not contain things which do not exist -- nothing (real) "contains" those, becuase they are not present to *be* contained. That said, humans seem to have a capacity to "contain" the *ideas* or even *models of* non-existant (imaginary) things.

To attempt to argue that a {defined "thing"} or even a {defined imaginary
"thing"} is not a member of the {universe} is self-evidently incorrect.

To attempt to argue that an imaginary thing (a non-existent entity) is a member of the universe *I* view as self-evidently incorrect. You might say that my definition of the universe (and "contain") is based on existence. However, since this is clearly a definitional kinda thing, I guess we can agree to disagree.