Some would ask how it is that one might trust-- according to my definition-- something outside of oneself (that is, if a "log" is completely "other" to a person... by what standard can we apply our trust as regards that log).
First, I do not think that trust is usually more than a gambit. That is, I DON'T think that one can truly trust a log (a log over a chasm... trust it to not break while crossing, for example).
The mechanism by which one trusts (I claim): One denies oneself and projects self-hood onto a desired object ("idolatry", to sell-out one's own faith in oneself for promises of material gain). So, one has no sense of self in this case except what is externally verified... one trusts oneself to the degree that a desired object is obtained... or, one trusts the object according to a degree of error from chance.
That is, chance resolves objective correlations to
a mean of zero-- this is called the null
hypothesis (which says that though it is
impossible to know anything for certain, there is
a chance of knowing a thing-- minus certainty-- to
a degree of error represented as a variation about
this mean of 0% probability). Trust is a gamble,
then, assuming that self-- in the idolatrous
situation-- is negated (a mean of zero), though
there is a chance for error about this mean
(represented by a correlation of observed
objects). BTW, this is also the formula for traditional phenomenology (the "spirit" of a thing affirms "itself" through negating its own object nature while simultaneously finding itself to exist as regards an object of desire).
SO: The degree of error to which one "trusts" a log is equal to the degree which the object nature of this log (or other logs) varies about a zero percent probability of being self-consistent... a degree correlative to that by which one negates one's own self-negation (or by which one affirms oneself in the negative). Thus, there is an ILLUSION that the log has a "soul" (the spirit projected upon it at the negation of the individual *soul* [the self consistency which is dis-affirmed for chance correlation]).
Though (secondly), there IS a process I call "naming"-- which is a type of phenomenology by which the soulful quality (consistency) is predicated in a cause and effect way upon an object such that the *object* is negated through SELF affirmation... as self transcendends the object nature represented. In this way, a person can trust an object according to his ability to perfectly internalize the characteristics OF that object (or to TRANSCEND his own object nature).
In this final case, the object is not an object
(so to speak) but is a phenomena of an existent
self which has being (existence which shows being in the moment). This is different from the process predicated upon a self which is objectified and which relates to other people as similar objects to "trust" (to a degree of error... or as regards the null of being in the moment).
Only in the second case can it be said that a person might trust a log because the log has a consistent nature, or "soul".
B. Lane Robertson