>/evolutionary strategy. However, you have to trust your estimate of the
>/likelihood of ruling successfully because as a ruler you automatically
>/become a target to outsiders as well as those who thirst for power under
>/your rule.
>
>Certainly. But taking this gamble can be quite rational.
It is actually a fairly simple expected value calculation using
decision analysis. Say the subjective value of inaction has a
baseline of 0, the value is ruling is Vr (>0) and the value of
being deposed is Vd (<0). Given the estimated probability of
being deposed Pd, and of ruling unopposed Pr = 1-Pd, then you
should rationally attempt to rule iff
-Vr/Vd > Pd/(1-Pd)
The real problem lies in estimating values for the variables.
>/As above "Do unto others ..."
>That's an assumed axiom. Not at all self-evident.
It's an empirical law if you interpret the tit-for-tat strategy
in the iterated prisoners dilemma as a game theoretic representation
of the Golden Rule.
>What's your conception of rational justification? By the evolutionary
>principles of Virus any race, anything remotely alive, can conceivably
>be a threat in the long run, merely by engaging in unlimited growth and
>eventually "needing" the resources taken up by my existence.
I think most of your resources *are* other living things, at least
indirectly. If all life on Earth vanished except for you, how long
would you survive?
-- David McFadzean dbm@merak.com Memetic Engineer http://www.merak.com/~dbm/ Merak Projects Ltd.